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of the

STATE OF UTAH
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THE E:JIPLOYERS LIABILITY
ASSrRANCE CORPORATION,
LTD., a corporation,
Defendant, Cross-Complainant
and Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
CROSS-COMPLAINANT AND RESPONDENT

W. J. SAUNDERS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The lower court found the facts in this case to be,
in brief, that one Jimmie Simpson sold a car to one
Haskell N. Bates and thereafter disappeared without
having obtained a title to the car for Mr. Bates. Simpson
was a bonded dealer and the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., was the surety on the bond of
Mr. Simpson. As a direct result of Simpson's failure
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to carry out his duties as a dealer, Mr. Bates suffered
damages and W. J. Saunders, who financed the transaction, suffered damages. The court awarded a decree
against the surety, Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., in favor of Mr. Bates and in favor of
Mr. Saunders. It is from this decree that the Employers
Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., prosecutes this
appeal.
W. J. Saunders, defendant, cross-complainant and
now respondent, is in substantial disagreement with
the statement of facts set forth by appellant, and finds
points of difference with the statement of facts appearing in the brief of respondent Bates, and therefore,
believes it desirable to make the following statement of
facts based on the evidence adduced at the trial.
Respondent, W. J. Saunders, and Jimmie Simpson
were each licensed and bonded used-car dealers under
the laws of the State of Utah (R. 12, Par. 2, R. 28, R. 41
F2, R. 50 F. 2 and 3). In the interest of economy, Saunders and Simpson did business from the same used-car
lot at 999 South Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah
(R. 167). They were not partners, and there was no
evidence that they shared profits or losses (R.168).
Each had his own cars to sell, and when one of them
sold a car belonging to the other, in contrast to splitting
of profits, the one whose car was sold paid the one who
sold it a fiat fee of $25.00 (R. 167-168).
On November 5, 1949, Haske! N. Bates, plaintiff
and respondent, purchased from Jimmie Simpson a
2
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19:1:7 CheYrolet Fleetline Sedan for the suin of $1,345.00
(R. 76). All of the transaction with respect to the sale
of this car was between Bates and Simpson. Bates did
not have any dealings with Saunders at the time the
car was sold (R. 76, 77, 78, 79, 101, 102, 106, 107, 123,
1~:1:, 125). At the time of the sale Bates signed a purchase agreement, four copies, in blank.. He did this for
the purpose of financing the car (R. 125, 270 Ex. 1 and
B. He received a copy of this purchase agreement
from Simpson which he was unable to produce at the
trial (R. 110). He also received a Used Car Order made
out by Simpson ( R. 77-78, 270; Ex. A).
Simpson was unable to finance the car and asked
Saunders to finance it for him, which Saunders did
through Strevell Paterson Finance Company (R. 153154). By financing the car Saunders could make a small
sum of money by way of the reserves which would be
earned if Bates paid out the contract, which reserve
would amount to approximately $70.00 (R. 155), and
since Saunders thought it was good paper, he bought
the paper and financed the car (R. 155-156).
The car was one which Simpson had brought in
from the State of California where he had obtained it
from Brokaw-Bauer, a California dealer. The title to
the car was forwarded by Brokaw-Bauer in the name
of Simpson to the Continental Bank, Central Branch
(R. 140, 250, 251, 252, R. 270 Ex. 10 and 11). Saunders
turned over the money secured through his financing of
the car to Simpson, in payment for the contract he pur-
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chased from Simpson (R. 175, 270; Ex. 7). It was
Simpson's responsibility to go to the bank and obtain
the title to the car which Simpson has sold to Bates
(R. 177-179). This Simpson failed to do, having apparently pocketed the money and disappeared (R. 140, 171).
Not at any time, prior to Simpson's disappearance,
did Bates even attempt to contact W. J. Saunders, and
in fact he did not contact Saunders until January 14,
1950, after he had been unable to locate Simpson for a
period of several weeks (R. 87), and when he did, he did
so for information about Simpson (R. 116, 123-124). Because Simpson failed to pay the amount due to BrokawBauer to the Continental Bank on the draft there in
Simpson's name, and thus release the title, BrokawBauer replevied the car through an action brought
against Bates in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 93-97). At the
time of this law suit, neither Bates nor Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., looked to Saunders
in connection with the transaction, and no effort was
made to interplead Saunders in that action (R. 140-142).
Saunders made no representations at any time in connection with this matter to anyone save Strevell Paterson
Finance Company, and he paid to Strevell Paterson
Finance Company the amout due on the car (R. 225-226).
Saunders in order to cover the Bates contract which
he re-negotiated with Strevell Paterson Finance Company, and which he guaranteed, authorized deductions
to be made from his reserves accumulated with the
4
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finance company, which deductions an1ounted to $867.75
(R. 231). Thus Saunders was directly damaged in the
amount of $St)7.75 as a result of Ji1nmie Si1npson's failure to acquit his duties as a dealer in Used Motor Vehicles in accordance with the requirements of the law
of this state (R. 183).
The bond furnished by Jin1n1ie Simpson as required
by law of a licensed dealer in used motor vehicles, and
upon which bond the appellant was surety, was in full
force and effect at the time of this transaction (R. 28,
Par 3). The bond is conditioned that the motor vehicle·
dealer, •·shall well and truly observe and comply with
all the require1nents and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REGl'LATION AND CONTROL
OF THE BrSIN"ESS OF DEALING IN MOTOR
VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah,
1949, and indemnify any and all persons, firms, and
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of the. fraud
or fraudulent representations m~de, or through the
violation of any of the provisions of said Motor Vehicle
Dealer's Act and shall pay all judgments and costs
adjudged against said principal on account of fraud
or fraudulent representations and for any violation or
violations of said law during the time of said license,
* * *" (R. 270, Ex. 12). The bond is, as required by
statute, in the penal sum of $5,000.00 (R. 28, Par. 3).
The respondent, W. J. Saunders, cross claimed against
the aforesaid surety, Employers Liability Assurance
Corporation, Ltd., for the loss which he suffered by
5
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virtue of Jimmie Simpson having absconded with the
funds turned over to him by Saunders, and failing to
obtain and deliver a prope·r title to the motor vehicle
which Simpson sold to Bates, as Simpson was required
by law to do (R. 23, 24, 25). The lower court found in
favor of Saunders and against the appellant (R. 51, 52,
53), and entered judgment accordingly (R. 47, 48), in
favor of Saunders for $867.75, together with his costs.
The court similarly found in favor of the plaintiff Bates,
and against the bonding company and entered judgment
on the plaintiff's complaint as amended in favor of
Bates in the sum of $933.52, together with his costs
(R. 39-46). The court dismissed the cross-complaint of
the Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd.
against Saunders and dismissed the complaint against
Saunders by Bates (R. 39, 48).
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
An attempt to reply to the briefs submitted by
counsel for appellant, and for respondent Bates, utilizing the same order of presentation of points and argument as followed in the respective briefs by them submitted does not result in a logical statement of the
case of the respondent Saunders. It is believed that
the court will find covered in the argument on the points
as hereinafter set forth, the reply of respondent Saunders to all of the points relied upon by the appellant
and by respondent Bates.

6
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POINT NO. I.
RESPONDENT SAUNDERS IS NOT LIABLE .TO RESPONDENT BATES OR TO APPELLANT FOR ANY INJURY
RESULTING FROM THE F AlLURE OF SIMPSON TO COMPLY WITH THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS ACT.

POINT NO. II.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT
APPELLANT WAS LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SAUNDERS
ON THE BOND OF JIMMIE SIMPSON IS SUPPORTED BY
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I.
RESPONDENT SAUNDERS IS NOT LIABLE TO RESPONDENT BATES OR TO APPELLANT FOR ANY INJURY
RESULTING FROM THE F AlLURE OF SIMPSON TO COMPLY WITH THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS ACT.

Jimmie Simpson was a licensed and bonded dealer
in used motor vehicles under the laws of the State of
Utah. This point was admitted by the pleadings of all
of the parties to the action (R. 1, 12, 23), and was so
found as a fact by the trial court (R. 50, F. 2), and
the appellant was the surety on the bond of the said
Jimmie Simpson, as admitted by the appellant in the
Answer to the Complaint (R. 28), and as so found
by the court (R. 52, F.10).
Jimmie Simpson obtained from a California dealer
in motor vehicles, Brokaw-Bauer, a 1947 Chevrolet
Fleetline Sedan which Jimmie Simpson brought in to
the state of Utah for the purpose of selling the same,
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and this fact, so found by the court (R. 50), is supported
by the evidence ( R. 97, 144, 186).
Haskell N. Bates, respondent, saw the motor vehicle
in question on the used car lot at 999 South Main Street
in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, on November 5, 1949
(R. 73, 76, 77). He talked to Jimmie Simpson about
the car, and Simpson let him take the car and try it out
(R. 77). Simpson quoted to Bates the price on the car
and told him what he would allow to Bates on the 1941
Ford which Bates was driving and which he wished to
turn in on the purchase of the Chevrolet (R. 76). Bates
being satisfied with the. car, asked Simpson to figure a
contract on the purchase of the car (R. 77). This Simpson did and made out a purchase order (R. 77, 78; R.
270, Ex. A), upon which Simpson wrote his name at the
top and Bates signed at the bottom (R. 77, 78; R. 270,
Ex. A).
As a down· payment on the purchase of this 1947
Chevrolet car, Bates turned in his 1941 Ford to Simpson
and obtained the title to the Ford from his residence,
which he endorsed in blank and turned over to Simpson
on the same day, November 5, 1949 (R. 78, 79; R. 270,
Ex. 2). Simpson thereafter sold the 1941 Ford which
Bates turned in to him, to one Henry Oliver, as reflected
by the records of the Tax Commission, Motor Vehicle
Department (R. 270, Ex. 5).
The same day, November 5, 1949, Simpson delivered
the possession of the Chevrolet to Bates and Bates kept
it until the same was replevied by Brokaw-Bauer in
the forepart of 1950 (R. 92).
8
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Saunders took no part in the sale which was made
or in any of the subsequent transactions with respect
to the securing of title, or license plate·s (R. 101, 102,
106, 111, 113, 116). In connection with the sale, the testimony of Bates, the purchaser, is clear and unequivocal.
Quoting from the record at pages 101 and 102.
Attorney:
Q. Now, :Jir. Bates, at the time that you entered
into this contract of purchase on this 1947
Chevrolet, was Mr. Saunders present~
Bates:
A. N"o sir.
Q. Did you have any dealing with Saunders in
regard to the purchase of this car or the sale
of the 1941 Ford which you turned in on this
car, at any time~
A. No, sir.

Q. You never had any dealings with him at all,
did you~
A. No, sir.
Again quoting from the record at page 123 we find
Bates testifying as follows :
Q. Now, Mr. Bates, at the time you purchased
this car from whom did you make the purchase~

A.

I bought the car from Jimmie Simpson.

Q. You didn't buy the car from Mr. Saunders~
That is Mr. Saunders sitting there, isn't it~
A. I didn't buy it from him.
Q. He didn't have anything to do with the sale
of the car, did he~
9
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A.

Not that I know of.

Q. Did Mr. Saunders at the time you purchased
this c~r, November 5, 1949, make any representatiOns to you at all concerning the car
either to its condition or its title1
'
A.

No, sir.

Q. You didn't even talk to him, did you 1
A. No, sir.
Q. You never talked to Mr. Saunders until
January 14, 1950, isn't that right1
A. That's right.
It therefore appears from the testimony of Bates,
the purchaser, that Saunders took no part in the actual
sale of the car. Furthermore, it should be noted that a
written contract is not necessary to a valid sale of a
motor vehicle. All that is required by law is that the
dealer:
"* * * upon transferring a vehicle of a type
subject to registration hereunde·r, whethe·r by
sale, lease, or otherwise, to any person other than
a manufacturer or dealer, shall immediately give
written notice of such transfer to the department
upon the official form provided by the department." 57-3a-73, U.C.A. 1943.
The report referred to by the section quoted above
must be accompanied by the indicia of title properly
endorsed. 57-3a-71 and 57-3a-76, U.C.A. 1943.
Thus, in this case, as between Simpson and Bates,
the sale could have been completed upon the delivery
of the car and title by Simpson to Bates and furnishing
10
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of the statutory dealer's notice to the departrnent and
upon the paYJ.nent of the purchase price in cash by Bates.
In such event had there been son1e discrepancy in the
title, or some failure to comply with the statutes on
the part of Simpson, the liability would have been clear
cut as between Bates, Simpson and the bonding cmupany.
If Saunders is to becmne involved in sharing liability
with Simpson to Bates, there must be either a legal
representatiYe authority by joint venture, partnership,
as a joint tort feasor, or otherwise. We have already
pointed out that Bates had no personal contact with
Saunders. \Yith considerable repetition appellant has
insisted that Saunders and Simpson were partners or
at least joint adventurers.
Our Supreme Court in Wasatch Livestock &!; Loan
Co. vs. Lewis &!; Sharp, 35 P. 2d 835, 84 Utah 347, has
said:
"Joint adventure is in the nature of partnership."
And in Kaumans vs. White Star Gas &!; Oil Co., 63
P. 2d 231, 92 Utah 24:
"Joint venture is in the nature of partnership and subject to the law of partnership so
far as substantial rights of the parties are concerned."
There is an absolute absence of any showing on
the part of appellant or of Bates, plaintiff below, that
Simpson and Saunders ever shared profits or losses,
or in any way acted as partners. The mere joint use
11
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of a lot upon which a sign was erected indicating the
name of both Saunders and Simpson is far from sufficient to prove partnership under any of the tests of the
Uniform Partnership Act adopted by the State of Utah.
It is particularly significant that these men each had
separate licenses issued by the state of Utah to sell used
cars, and the sign at the Jot on which the names of both
Simpson and Saunders appeared, referred to the separate bonds of each of them, negativing any assumption
that these men were operating jointly as a partnership.
Bates testified that he noticed the sign. We quote from
page 85 of the record.
Attorney:
Q. Did it have any signs on it~
Bates:
A. Yes, it had a sign on the roof, on the front
part of the roof.

Q. What did it say~
A. W. J. Saunders and Jimmie Simpson. I believe it said, "Used Cars and Bonded Dealers" under each one's name.
Q. Under each one separately~
A. And give the number. The number of the
bond.
Bates further testified that on one occasion he believed Simpson had referred to Saunders as a partner,
but at no time did Bates ever testify that he believed
Saunders was Simpson's partner, and under these circumstances there could be no partnership by estoppel,
there not having been any substantial representation
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and no reliance by Bates.
The Uniform Partnership Act, as adopted in the
state of Utah, provides :
69-1-13. U.C.A. 19±3. Partner by Estoppel.
" ( 1) \vnen a person by words spoken or
written or by conduct represents himself, or consents to another's representing him, to any one
as a partner, in an existing partnership or with
one or more persons not actual partners, he is
liable to any such person to whom such repre~
sentation has been made who has on the faith of
such representation given credit to the actual
or apparent partnership, and, if he has made·
such representation or consented to its being
made in a public manner, he is liable to such
person, whether the representation has or has
not been made or communicated to such person
so giving credit by, or with the knowledge of, the
apparent partner making the representation or
consenting to its being made."
In this case we submit that the record does not
contain any evidence or one word of testimony that
Saunders at any time consented to the representation by
Simpson that he was a partner, with Simpson, or that
Saunders at any time publicly or to Bates ever held
himself forth as a partner with Simpson. It will be
noted that in the absence of public representation, under
the statute quoted, the act of the party seeking to invoke
the estoppel must have been taken in reliance on the
existence of the partnership. In this case Bates testified that no representation whatever was made concerning Saunders until after the transaction was completed
13
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except that a few days after he bought the car, he believed the following Monday, the day of the transaction
having been a Saturday, when he returned to see Simpson, Simpson made mention of Saunders as being either
his finance man, or his partner, Bates was not sure which
(R. 84, 85). There is no showing at any point in the
record of any act or omission to act by Bates, in reliance
upon the representation by Simpson of Saunders as
his partner. We again stress the fact that there is not
one word in the record which indicates that Saunders
had any knowledge of such representation ever at any
time having been made.
With equal emphasis and reiteration appellant further contends that the respondent Saunders and Simpson
were joint tort feasors. The baseless scurrility of appellant's contentions at page 32 of his brief, wherein respondent Saunders is referred to as a "conspirator" and
by inference as a "thief" is not justified by the zealousness of counsel to serve his client to the fullest extent.
On the contrary it is unbecoming of ethical practice, and
employs the tactics of a school boy, who, being outwitted
and void of argument in desperation resorts to name
calling. Neither opposing counsel has, or can cite, one
instance of a false or fraudulent representation made
by Saunders to Bates. In fact, all of .Bates' testimony
was to the exact opposite, that he did not see Saunders
until January 14, 1950, two months and ten days after
this sale had been made by Simpson to Bates, and Bates
had been in possession of the car all of that time (R.
90, 101, 123, 124).
14
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.. The essential elements required to sustain
an action for deceit are, generally speaking, that
a representation was made as a statement of fact,
which was untrue and known to be untrue by
the party making it, or else recklessly made;
that it was 1nade with intent to deceive and for
the purpose of inducing the other party to act
upon it; and that he did in fact rely on it and
was induced thereby to act to his injury or
damage." American Jurisprudence, Vol. 23, P.
773, Sec. 20. Also see H eckt v. Metzler, 14 Utah
408, -!S P. 37.
A careful scrutiny of the transcript and record
will reveal that with the exception of the representation
made by Simpson to Bates at the time when Bates returned to see Simpson concerning the financing, that
Saunders was ''his partner or finance man," (R. 84), the
representations of Simpson were, so far as can be determined, truthful. The fact is that Simpson did have the
right to sell the car, he apparently did have the intention
of complying with his obligations as a dealer at the
time that he sold the car to Bates, and he did have at
his command the means of obtaining the necessary title
to the car. The fact is, that in spite of the truth of the
representations which were made, in spite of his apparent honest intentions at the time of the sale, weeks later,
Simpson absconded with the money obtained in the
transaction and failed to carry out the burden imposed
upon him by law as a dealer in used motor vehicles.
The question of the truth or falsity of any of the representations made by him is not conclusive of the issues
to be decided in this case, for the liability on the bond
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arises not alone from fraud, but from non compliance
with the statute as well. The latter is made out, and by
virtue of Simpson's failure both Bates and Saunders
suffered loss. The statement in the brief of the appellant
appearing at page 29, "It is apparent that the Trial
Judge simply brushed over the law of deceit and fraud
in an effort to hold the Bonding Company liable, without
permitting it to recover against the real tort feasors
on its indemnity agreement," is as illogical and untrue
as is the analysis provided by the appellant in its brief
on the law of the subject. By way. of illustration of this
statement we wish to direct the court's attention to one
instance of this kind in the brief of the appellant. There
the appellant quotes from the Restatement of Torts, Vol.
4, Pages 435, 436 and 439. In so doing appellant emphasizes a small portion of a sentence out of clause (c), "and
is a substantial factor in causing the result," and then
builds his argument on this emphasized passage paying
no heed to the balance of the paragraph which completely
changes the entire aspect of the problem. When read in
its entirety, one finds that the gist of the offense recognized by the Restatement as being a factor in constituting one ·a joint tort feasor is that the act of the party
sought to be bound as a joint tort feasor must by itself
constitute a breach of duty and this act must then be a
substantial factor in causing the result. The importance
of the entire context cannot be overlooked, and in this
case, we submit that no act of Saunders, as reflected by
the testimony and the evidence, constituted a breach of
duty. The law imposes no obligation upon Saunders to
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be unusually wary of Sin1pson n1erely because they were
both dealers in used rnotor Ye hicles. Saunders had no
reason to distrust Simpson, and had Simpson performed
as he agreed to do the transaction would have met with
everyone's satisfaction. The tort was that of Sirnpson,
and Saunders was as rnuch injured thereby as anyone.
We submit that the appellant does not sustain the burden of showing Saunders to be a joint tort feasor with
Jimmie Simpson.
Left groping for straws then, in his frantie effort
to pin the liability for the failure of Simpson on Saunders rather than on the Bonding Company, the appellant seizes upon the fact that Sunders signed as "SellerDealer" when making application to Strevell Paterson
Finance Company for a loan. Let us remember that
Saunders has paid in full to Strevell Paterson Finance
Company, admitting his liability in financing the loan,
but the chasm in logic which appellant has failed to span
is the connection between Bates an~ Saunders, either
by way of contract or misrepresentation. Bates admitted
that he signed the contract known as "purchase agreement" (R. 270, Ex. 1 and B), in blank knowing and
understanding that it was to be used in obtaining necessary financing (R. 122, 125). Mr. Minson, manager of
the automobile finance department of the Strevell Paterson Finance Company, testified that the signing as seller
dealer was common practice with dealers doing business
with Strevell Paterson Finance Company when they
sought to finance a deal under circumstances such as
this (R. 229-230).
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Jones on Evidence, second edition, Vol. 4, P. 3261
'
Sec. 1770, states :
"Consent to the filling of blanks is often
implied where an instrument is signed and delivered and blank spaces are left unfilled. It has
often been held in such cases that the holder
has implied authority to fill the blanks in conformity to the general character of the, paper.
Such authority has been implied in connection
with blanks left in deeds, sealed instruments generally, simple contracts, * * *."
Saunders exercised this implied power to fill in the
blanks in conformity to the general character of the
paper, and did so exactly as it had been contemplated
by Bates that someone would do, for the purpose of
financing. The representations thus made by Saunders
to Strevell Paterson Finance Company were authorized
by Bates who gave the instrument in blank for the express purpose of securing financing. Bates cannot now
be heard to complain of the representations so made,
and Saunder~ lived up to his representations to Strevell
Paterson Finance Company. We have in this case no
demand by Strevell Paterson Finance Company. In this
case both of the parties now seeking to fix responsibility
and liability on Saunders made exactly the same mistake
as did Saunde,rs ; they all trusted Simpson, and Simpson
failed to perform. Such use of this instrument for the
purposes afore-stated is freely admitted by Bates and
by Saunders. Appellant takes the unusual position that
Saunders and Bates cannot agree upon the true state
of facts or testify thereto because of a written instru-

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment used between them, it being further the contention
of appellant that to give any explanation of that instrument beyond the tenus thereof would be a violation of
the parol evidence rule. Appellants cite no case in support of this unusual assertion that a third party can
vary the agreed state of facts by raising a technical
rule of evidence which neither of the parties involved
have cared to assert. If such were the law a third party
could prevent the original parties to a transaction from
explaining the circumstances under which a document
was made and given. The tendency of the court seems
to be in exactly the opposite direction even though the
parties directly involved themselves raise the objection.
"The complicated dealings between many of
those trafficking in and loaning money on automobiles have reached a point where the courts
must strip transactions of their pretenses and
look at them as they really are, with the camouflage of papers giving a similitude of passing
title removed, or they will be dealing with fictions
instead of facts. Those who buy and sell, bail
and loan money on motor vehicles must be given
to understand that the realities of their transactions will be sought for by the courts, they
will look through the screen of paper titles to
ascertain what was the real situation." Root v.
Republic Acceptance Corporation, 123 A. 650,
Supreme Court of Pa., 1924.

It is upon these facts and principles of law that
we conclude that no liability either to Bates or to the
Appellant has been made out as against the respondent
Saunders, and to this conclusion is added the weight of
the trial court's decision.
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POINT NO. II.
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT
APPELLANT WAS LIABLE TO RESPONDENT SAUNDERS
ON THE BOND OF JIMMIE SIMPSON IS SUPPORTED BY
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

Heretofore in the argument under Porint I we
have set forth in detail the facts adduced at the trial
relating to the sale of the 1947 Chevrolet Fleetline
Sedan to respondent Bates, by Simpson. Jimmie Simpson as a licensed dealer in used motor vehicles under
the laws of the state of Utah was bonded. It was stipulated by counsel that the form and style of the bond
is identical with Ex.12, R. 270, and that on such bond
Jimmie Simpson was principal and the appellant was
the surety ( R. 257; R. 28, second defense). It will be
noted that the bond is a joint and several obligation,
therefore, the appellant and Jimmie Simpson are both
liable individually for loss resulting from breach of the
conditions of the bond. By way of general authority
for this statement we cite section 45 of American Jurisprudence, Vol. 8 page 726:
"Sureties Liability As PrincipaL-The rule
is well settled that when principal and surety
are bound jointly and severally on a bond, although there is no express admission on the face
of the instrument that all are principals, yet
the surety cannot aver by pleading that he is
surety only. Hence, when one who is in reality
only surety is willing to place himself in the situ~
tion of principal by expressly declaring upon his
contract that he binds himself as such, it has been
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held that there is no hardship in holding him
to the character in which he assumes to place
hin1self."
The conditions of the bond are set forth therein as
follows:
I~XO\Y

~\LL

~[EN

BY

THESE PRESEXTS : That we, ____________ of·-------------------~----------- as
principal, and ______________________________ a surety company
qualified and authorized to do business in the
state of rta.h as surety, are jointly and severally
held and firn1ly bound to the people of the state
of r tah to indemnify any and all persons, firms
and corporations for any loss suffered by reason
of violation of the conditions hereinafter contained, in the penal sum of __________________________ Dollars,
lawful money of the Fnited States, for the payment of which, well and truly to be made·, we
bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly, severally
and firmly by these presents.
The condition of this obligation is such, That,
\\lhereas, the above bounden principal has applied for a license to do business as a-------------------:Motor Vehicle ---------------------------- within the state of
Utah, and that pursuant to the application a
license has been or is about to be issued,
Now, Therefore, if the above bounden principal shall obtain said license to do business as
such ------------------------ :Motor Vehicle---------------------- and
shall well and truly observe and comply with all
the requirements and provisions of the Act Profviding For The Regulation And Control Of The
Business Of Dealing In 1\Iotor \Tehicles, as provided by Chapter 67 Laws of Utah 1949, and
indemnify any and all persons, firms and cor-
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porations for any loss suffered by reason of the
fraud or fraudulent representations made or
through the violation of any of the provisions
of said Motor Vehicle Dealer's Act and shall pay
all judgments and costs adjudged against said
principal on account of fraud or fraudulent representations and for any violation or violations
of said law during the time of said license and
all lawful renewals thereof, then the· above obligations shall be null and void, otherwise to remain
in full force and effect. (R. 270, Ex. 12).
It will be observed that Section 13 of Chapter 67
Laws of Utah 1949 sets forth the Act prohibited, and
thereunder it is stated:
"It shall be unlawful and a violation of this
act for the holder of any license issued under the
terms and provisions hereof: * * * (D) To violate any law of the State of Utah now existing
or hereafter enacted respecting commerce in
motor vehicles or any lawful rule or regulation
respecting commerce in motor vehicles promulgated by any licensing or regulating authority
now existing or hereafter created by the laws
of the state of Utah."
By 57-3a-73 U.C.A.1943 it is provided:
"Every manufacturer or dealer upon transferring a vehicle of a type subject to registration
hereunder whether by sale, lease or otherwise,
to any person other than a manufacturer or
dealer, shall immediately give. written notice
of such transfer to the department upon the official form provided by the department. Every such
notice shall contain the date of such transfer,
the names and addresses of the transferor and
transferee, and such description of the vehicle
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as n1ay be called for in such official form."
It is further provided by law at 57-6-5 U.C.A. 1943:
Certificate of Title to Yendee.
Every person, finn, or corporation upon the
sale and delivery of any used or second hand
n1otor vehicle shall within forty-eight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed according
to law, a certificate of title, issued for said vehicle
by the State Ta..x Commission.
As a licensed and bonded dealer in used motor
vehicles under the law of the State of Utah, Jimmie
Simpson ·was required to comply with these provisions
of the law and all other pertinent provisions. As has
been shown he was specifically bonded so to do, and the
appellant was the surety on that bond. Having sold the
car to Haskel N. Bates, respondent herein, Simpson was
then obligated to give notice to the department and
furnish a certificate of title to Simpson in accordance
with the provisions of the law above set out. Simpson
did neither of these things. The record shows as previously set forth, that Simpson took the car turned in
by Bates and sold the same (R. 270, Ex. 2 and 5). He
alone received the proceeds of that transaction, Saunders received nothing therefrom (R.170).
When Saunders financed the transaction he turned
over the money he received from the finance company
to Simpson (R. 175 and 270, Ex. 7). Simpson was obligated and required to obtain the certificate of title on
the 19-1:7 Chevrolet sold to Bates and this he failed to
do. It was testified by Saunders and was supported by
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the testimony of the employee of the Continental Bank,
Mr. Joseph Max Soelberg, that Simpson was the only
one who could obtain the title from the Continental
Bank (R. 177, 178, 251, 253). Saunders testified that
he trusted Simpson (R. 171). He had no reason not
to trust him, just as the appellant and respondent Bates
trusted him. Had Simpson performed as he agreed to
do, and as he was bound by law to do there would be
no grounds for this law suit. But Simpson failed to perform. He pocketed the money and he disappeared.
As a result of this failure on the part of Simpson to
obtain the title to the car and pay off the draft in his
name at the Continental Bank in the amount of $1,225.00,
Saunders was required to pay to Strevell Paterson
Finance Company the amount of $867.75, which he did
as testified to by Mr. Minson (R. 231, 270; Ex. 8). Saunders thus suffered a loss amounting to $867.75, which
amount is increased by his costs incurred in this action,
and this loss resulted directly, proximately, and solely
because of the failure of Jimmie Simpson to comply
with the laws of this state as a licensed dealer in used
motor vehicles, and in violation of the Act Providing For
The Regulation And Control Of The Business Of Dealing In Motor Vehicles. Since Simpson's failure constituted a breach of the condition of the bond on which
the appellant is surety, the appellant is liable to Saunders for the loss which he suffered. And there is no
need to argue the point as to whether Saunders purchased the automobile, or the contract, as is done by the
appellant, at page 44 of its brief, because Saunders
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is a person protected under the tenm; of the bond,
and the acts of Sin1pson were a violation of the conditions of the bond.
As to the ru.nount of the dmnage suffered, the appellant raises a question at Point VI in his brief, where
appellant claims that Saunders deducted $29.90 from
the remittance which he made to Simpson, and that the
judgment should not in any event be affirmed as to this
amount. It is submitted that a review of the record will
show that other than for passing reference to the question of sales tax during the cross examination of Saunders, nothing was ever raised at the trial on this point,
and the trial court was never asked to rule thereon.
We believe that it is generally accepted that an appeal
does not lie from matters not ruled on by the trial court.
If in preparing his appeal, appellant discovered that
this claim should have been asserted, it is too late to
draw the matter to the attention of the trial court at
this time since no such claim was made in the pleadings
or presented orally to the court. And it is much too
early to assert that the trial court erred before the trial
court has had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.
A Point VII the appellant in its brief attempts to fix
liability upon Saunders for the default of Simpson on
the basis of the~ fact that both Simpson and Saunders
were bonded by the appellant and that it became thei
duty of Saunders to protect the appellant against loss
because of and by virtue of the terms of the application
for bond filed by Saunders. This is an action brought
upon the bond of Simpson, not on the bond of Saunders.
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The breach in the condition of the bond is Simpson's
breach, there is no defalcation by Saunders. Simply
because both men were bonded by appellant does not
license appellant to use the obligations of both dealers
interchangeably to suit the whim 9f the Assurance Corporation.
We have heretofore fully discussed the lack of liability from Saunders to Bates and since this is the
premise upon which appellants argument is based it
follows that the application of Saunders for his bond
is irrelevant to the issues in this case.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be sustained
and the judgment of the court made and entered in
favor of respondent Saunders and against Appellant
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN S. BOYDEN,
ALLEN H. TIBBALS,
.Attorneys for Respondent,
W. J. Saunders.
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